Foundation for the offline-cache hardening story. The offline cache
needs to persist per-track AES content keys to disk, but storing them
plaintext would make copying the SQLite DB enough to decrypt the
cached audio on another machine.
qbz-secrets provides a uniform wrap/unwrap API backed by:
1. **OS keyring** (preferred): libsecret/gnome-keyring on Linux,
Keychain on macOS, DPAPI on Windows. A 256-bit master AES key
lives inside the OS secure store; all wraps go through it. This
is the gold-standard device binding used by commercial music
apps (Spotify, Apple Music, Tidal) for the same class of data.
2. **HKDF fallback**: when the OS keyring is not reachable (headless
setups — Raspberry Pi, Docker, the future qbzd daemon on a
server), the master key is derived on demand via HKDF-SHA256
over service_name + machine_id + a persistent per-install UUID.
Weaker than keyring (reversible by anyone with filesystem access
to both sources) but still device-bound against cross-machine
copy attacks, and lets daemon/headless variants work at all.
Every wrap uses AES-256-GCM with a fresh random 12-byte nonce. The
on-disk envelope carries a version byte + backend marker + nonce +
ciphertext+tag, so (a) we detect tampering via GCM, (b) we refuse to
silently unwrap a blob produced by a backend we can't reach, and (c)
we have a forward-compat path for future key rotation.
4 unit tests cover: small-secret round-trip, 16-byte content-key
round-trip (the exact CMAF use case), GCM tamper detection, and
nonce-randomness (two wraps of the same input differ).
This crate intentionally has zero QBZ dependencies — it's a generic
primitive. Next commits wire it into the offline cache schema + the
DB migration.
cc
vicrodh
1743c9e5ec