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qbz/crates/qbz-secrets/Cargo.toml
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TOML

[package]
name = "qbz-secrets"
version.workspace = true
edition.workspace = true
license.workspace = true
description = "Device-bound secret wrapping for QBZ (offline cache keys, tokens)"
[dependencies]
# AES-256-GCM for the at-rest wrap/unwrap
aes-gcm = "0.10"
# KDF for the fallback path when OS keyring isn't available
hkdf = "0.12"
sha2 = "0.10"
# RNG for nonces + install UUID generation
rand = "0.9"
# UUID for the persistent install identifier (salt component for fallback)
uuid = { version = "1", features = ["v4", "serde"] }
# Serde for the on-disk wrapper blob envelope
serde = { workspace = true }
# Base64 for keyring-roundtripped master key (secret-service expects a UTF-8 string)
base64 = { workspace = true }
# Errors
thiserror = { workspace = true }
log = { workspace = true }
[dev-dependencies]
tempfile = "3"
# OS keyring backends: libsecret/secret-service (Linux), Keychain (macOS),
# DPAPI (Windows). **Desktop only, deliberately.** keyring 3.x compiles no real
# backend for Android, and none for iOS without its `apple-native` feature — it
# routes both to an in-memory `mock` whose writes *succeed*. Depending on it
# there would not fail loudly; it would hand back a master key that never
# leaves the process, so every blob wrapped in one run is undecryptable in the
# next. Mobile takes the KDF path, which is derived from a persisted install id
# and is stable across launches. See `backend.rs`.
[target.'cfg(not(any(target_os = "android", target_os = "ios")))'.dependencies]
keyring = "3"